

THE EUROPEAN UNION'S COMMON SECURITY AND DEFENCE POLICY IN THE PERIOD 2016-2023: SUCCESSES AND FAILURES

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INTRODUCTION

The aim of the article is to analyse the European Union's Common Security and Defence Policy and to show its essence, evolution and related reforms taking place successively in the years 2016-2023. I pay particular attention to theoretical aspects and determinants of the European Union's CSDP activities, as well as to their successes and failures. In short, it concerns the sphere of the EU's activity that over decades of the European integration has been considered to be within the competence of its Member States. The EU's current activity in the field of European security shows that it is a specific organisation that does not operate very dynamically. It cannot keep up with the rapidly changing international reality. Its actions are usually late and lack preventive nature, which is demonstrated by Russia's aggression against Ukraine².

Contradictory assessments regarding the condition, tasks, goals and the future of the Union and its activities for the security of Europe prevail among researchers and politicians. On the one hand, the dominating opinion is that the EU has already created a specific system of internal ties, has developed its own structures and original governance procedures, and its bodies reflect a specific system of legislative, executive and judicial powers with limited possibilities of coercion. In their opinion, the EU

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² S. Millard, *More is in Europe*, "Newsletter of the Jacques Delors Institute", February 2022, pp. 1–17; J.M. Fiszer, T. Stepniewski (ed.), *Unia Europejska w turbulentnym świecie. 30 lat traktatu z Maastricht*, Instytut Europy Środkowej, Lublin-Warszawa 2022.



sets the most favourable direction for the development of entire Europe and together with NATO cares for its security. On the other hand, there are opinions that for years the EU has been drifting in an unknown direction, which poses a serious threat to it, and that it needs new reforms and improvement of the Community structures and new principles of cooperation, as well as strengthening the European and global awareness among the Member States, their citizens and political elites. Brexit, i.e. the withdrawal of the United Kingdom from the EU's structures, which eventually took place on 31 January 2020, deepened these pessimistic assessments. Brexit seriously weakened the economic and military potential of the European Union, and thus the security of Europe³.

At the same time, the number of weak, failing and bankrupt states in the world is growing year by year⁴. In addition to the arms race, violation of the principles of international law and international terrorism, they constitute one of the main threats to the security of Europe and the world. This internal weakness of states and aggressiveness of the stronger states towards the weaker ones became the reason for the outbreak of most conflicts after the end of the Cold War. They include ones that were and are as dangerous for world peace as the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, the Russian-Georgian war, the war in Syria, the war between Russia and Ukraine and the war between Israel and Hamas⁵.

The above-mentioned wars and international conflicts, which confirm the thesis that the contemporary world is becoming less and less stable and poses a serious threat to international security, were accompanied by the superpowers' struggle for a new world order. At the same time, the role of the Atlantic Community in the international arena was weakening because the EU and NATO could not reach a consensus on the forms and scope of further cooperation and methods of fighting for peace in the world for a long time. The paths of Europe and the United States diverged significantly. Their mutual bonds and cooperation were no longer as strong as during the Cold

³ J.M. Fiszer, *Unia Europejska po brexicie*, [in:] J.M. Fiszer (ed.), *Unia Europejska-Chiny w XXI wieku*, Instytut Studiów Politycznych PAN, Warszawa 2018, pp. 35–71.

⁴ For more on the issue see: S.S. Erikson, 'State Failure' in *Theory and Practice: The Idea of the State and the Contradictions of State Formation*, "Review of International Studies" 2011, no. 1, pp. 221–231; R. Rybkowski, *Komu potrzebne są państwa upadłe?*, [in:] R. Kłosowicz, A. Mania (ed.), *Problem upadku państw w stosunkach międzynarodowych*, Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Jagiellońskiego, Kraków 2012, pp. 15–23; T. Srogosz, *Upadłość państwa z perspektywy prawa międzynarodowego*, "Sprawy Międzynarodowe" 2009, no. 2, 71–89.

⁵ L. Klingbeil, *Wir müssen in Europa aufpassen, dass wir nicht den Anschluss verlieren*, "IPG-Journal" <ipg-journal@fes.de>, 16.10.2023; A.D. Rotfeld, *Polityka suwerennej Polski w niestabilnym świecie*, "Sprawy Międzynarodowe", 2008, no. 4, p. 10; J.M. Fiszer, *Zadania i cele polityki zagranicznej Władimira Putina*, "Myśl Ekonomiczna i Polityczna", 2016, volume 52, no. 1, pp. 167–201.

War. In the early 1990s, it was wrongly assumed that the neoliberal world developing under the control of the United States, the world of the free market and democracy, would bring solutions that would lead to the emergence of a new world: a world of freedom, democracy, peace and prosperity shaped in the image and likeness of *Pax Americana*. However, this did not happen because new contenders for control of the world appeared, i.e. China and Russia under the rule of President Vladimir Putin, who already during the Munich Security Conference in 2007 spoke about the end of the “unipolar” world, having in mind the United States’ domination. He then spoke out against the American hegemony and expansionism⁶.

The goals and tasks that Putin has set for Russia’s foreign policy are dangerous for Europe and the entire world and for international peace and security. They may lead to the outbreak of World War III. Therefore, the European Union’s CSDP requires radical and quick reforms so that together with NATO it is able to ensure that Europe is secure⁷.

For this to happen, the European Union needs new strength and further reforms today; in particular, the decision-making process must be changed, inter alia, by means of abolition or limitation of the right of veto in matters relating to the CSDP. It should be limited especially when the EU Council takes decisions on matters relating to the European security. For example, vetoing further Brussels’ packages of sanctions against Russia by Viktor Orban is food for thought. It should apply only to selected issues such as sanctions and include a system of effective guarantees to protect the interests of the Member States. Moreover, the European Union for too long believed in the protective umbrella of the United States and NATO, as well as in the saving strength of *soft power*, and it has failed. Therefore, the article analyses the existing mechanisms ensuring that bodies representing supranational interests participate in the decision-making processes and that, at the same time, the Member States’ governments have a decision-making guarantee (inter alia, within the EU Council). I also draw attention to the role of the Lisbon Treaty in the process of shaping and developing the Common Security and Defence Policy.

I propose several theses and hypotheses on this topic, as well as several research questions for discussion. Inter alia, I state that in terms of the CSDP’s content and importance for the security of the EU Member States and the role it plays or should play in the Euro-Atlantic security system, theoretically it is one of the most important

⁶ P. Buhler, *O potężne w XXI wieku*, Wydawnictwo Akademickie DIALOG, Warszawa 2014, p. 186; M. Budzisz, *Rosyjska strategia rozgrywki z Zachodem*, “Analizy Międzynarodowe”, 2021, no. 2, pp. 77–89.

⁷ Former advisor to President Donald Trump, John Bolton, recently revealed that Beijing is already preparing for a military confrontation and will pursue it at all costs. See W. Kozicki, *Wojna USA z Chinami? „Szykują się”*, <https://www.planeta.pl/wiadomości>, 30.10.2023.

common policies of the European Union but in practice its authorities neglected it, especially in the years 1993-2014. It was not a priority task at that time. The situation changed only after 2014 due to President Vladimir Putin's intensifying neo-imperial policy, which resulted in the annexation of Crimea by the Russian Federation. As a result, the balance of the European Union's activities for reforming and strengthening the CSDP includes successes alongside failures, especially when it comes to its utilitarian aspects. This is another thesis of the paper. On the other hand, the question concerns the reasons for this state of affairs, which are quite complex. They are objective and subjective in nature. Thus, the answer is not easy. In my opinion, this was largely due to the doctrine of neoliberalism and globalisation based on false premises, which was imposed on Europe and the world by American politicians and theorists after the end of the Cold War. They spoke about the end of the recent history and wars in international relations, and basing them on universal values and norms of international law. A priori theses were proposed on building a new democratic and peaceful world order without an arms race, conflicts and rivalry, based on equal cooperation between states and nations around the world. Due to the above, both in theory and in practice, the concept of *soft power* understood as a system of values, cultural identity and its political activities in the international arena started to dominate in the internal and international policy of the European Union⁸. *Soft power* has become the foundation and, at the same time, a method of conducting and implementing foreign policy by the European Union in practice⁹. It also had a significant impact on the formation of the European Union's Common Security and Defence Policy and its subsequent reforms and evolution in the years 2016-2023. Idealising the international reality, the European Union placed less emphasis on *hard power*, and underestimated the use of hard instruments such as military force or political and military activities. Therefore, the European Union was not treated in the international arena as a traditional military power capable of conducting military activities. As I have already mentioned, it was only after 2014, with the intensification of Vladimir Putin's imperial policy, that the

⁸ J.M. Fiszer, *Geneza traktatu z Maastricht: determinanty międzynarodowe i jego znaczenie dla bezpieczeństwa Europy po zakończeniu zimnej wojny*, [in:] J.M. Fiszer, T. Stepniowski (ed.), *Unia Europejska w turbulentnym świecie. 30 lat traktatu z Maastricht*, Instytut Europy Środkowej, Lublin-Warszawa 2022, pp. 15–38; S. Parzymies, *Unia Europejska jako uczestnik stosunków międzynarodowych*, [in:] S. Parzymies (ed.), *Dyplomacja czy siła? Unia Europejska w stosunkach międzynarodowych*, Polski Instytut Spraw Międzynarodowych, Warszawa 2009, pp. 24–31.

⁹ J.S. Ney, *Soft power. Jak osiągnąć sukces w polityce światowej*, Polski Instytut Spraw Międzynarodowych, Warszawa 2007. B. Piskorska, *Soft power w polityce UE wobec państw Partnerstwa Wschodniego*, Wydawnictwo KUL, Lublin 2017, pp. 11–13; O. Barbarska, *Polityka wschodnia Unii Europejskiej jako część składowa polityki zagranicznej UE*, Oficyna Wydawnicza ASPRA-JR, Warszawa 2018, pp. 119–163.

slow transformation of the EU's CSDP started, which meant the EU abandoned promoting only a peace project and started changing into a competitive geopolitical actor struggling for influence¹⁰. This is evidenced, inter alia, by a statement included in "The EU Global Strategy" adopted in June 2016, speaking about the need to strengthen *soft power* with the use of a hard dimension of power, i.e. *hard power*¹¹.

In my opinion, the formation and principles of functioning of the European Union's CSDP, as well as its reforms were also influenced by the belief that was widespread in Europe at the time that the North Atlantic Alliance led by the powerful United States is a guarantor of its security and peace in the world and, therefore, there is no need to create a separate EU army. A breakthrough in this philosophy of thinking and the EU security policy occurred only in the years 2017-2021, i.e. during the presidency of Donald Trump, who even threatened to liquidate NATO if the remaining members did not increase expenditures on its maintenance. Donald Trump's ambivalent attitude towards American presence in Europe within NATO and cooperation with the EU raised concerns among the European Union's leaders¹². It was when German Chancellor Angela Merkel stated that we could no longer base our security solely on NATO and the alliance with the United States, and that the EU must ensure its own security, inter alia, through the creation of autonomous armed forces¹³. Emanuel Macron, who spoke about "the brain death of NATO", supported the idea. The above raises another question: To what extent did the competition for leadership in the EU between Germany and France and the United States' treatment of the Union influence the shape and reforms as well as the achievements and failures of the Common Security and Defence Policy? In my opinion, they had a significant impact¹⁴. This is another hypothesis that I put forward and discuss in the article.

¹⁰ R. Sakwa, *The Death of Europe? Continental Fates after Ukraine*, "International Affairs" 2015, No. 3, Vol. 91, pp. 553–555.

¹¹ F. Mogherini, *Foreword*, [in:] *Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger Europe*, Brussels 2016, p. 14; F. Tereszkiewicz, *Globalna strategia Unii Europejskiej: Refleksja konstruktywistyczna*, "Politeja" 2018, no. 4(55), pp. 129–151.

¹² B. Szklarski, *Przyszłość stosunków Unii Europejskiej i Stanów Zjednoczonych w 2020 roku (i dalej)*, [in:] K.A. Wojtaszczyk, T. Wallas, P. Stawarz (ed.), *Przyszłość Unii Europejskiej*, Oficyna Wydawnicza ASPRA-JR, Warszawa 2023, pp. 351–369; *NATO-EU Relations*, 2019, NATO Factsheet February 2019, https://www.nato.int/nato_static_fi2014/assets/pdf/pdf_2019_02/20190208_1902-factsheet-nato-eu-en.pdf, 13.10.2023.

¹³ T. Kamiński, *Don't Look at Trump: The EU Needs Strategic Autonomy*, "4liberty.eu", 2022, p. 34, <http://4liberty.eu/review-16-dont-look-at-trump-eu-needs-strategic-autonomy>, 14.11.2023.

¹⁴ M. Riddervold, G. Rosé, *Unified in response to rising powers? China, Russia and EU-US relations*, "Journal of European Integration" 2018, vol. 40, no. 5, pp. 555–570; T.G. Grosse, "Motor integracyjny" pod kierunkiem francuskim, [in:] K.A. Wojtaszczyk, T. Wallas, P. Stawarz (ed.), *Przyszłość Unii Europejskiej ...*, pp. 113–129.

Obviously, there were also other reasons rooted in the genesis of the EU and the successive processes of its expansion and deepening, which were behind the evolution and reforms of the CSDP as well as its successes and failures. Russia's aggression against Ukraine on 24 February 2022 also had a significant impact on the evolution and reforms of the CSDP and the necessary changes in the EU's foreign policy and the European security strategy. It even became their accelerator¹⁵.

To analyse the above-mentioned problems, I used a few theories, including the theory of European integration, classical realism, historical and systemic analysis and the theory of political decisions. On the other hand, the dominating research methods used in the article include exegesis of documents, description and analysis of international phenomena and processes, historical analysis, and decision-based and comparative methods. The analysis is carried out based on the Polish and foreign literature on the subject, documents published and data obtained from the press and the Internet.

1. THE EUROPEAN UNION'S COMMON SECURITY AND DEFENCE POLICY AND ITS GENESIS AND SIGNIFICANCE FOR THE SECURITY OF EUROPE

There is extensive literature on the genesis, essence, goals and tasks of the European Union's Common Security and Defence Policy and these are quite well researched issues, however, it is worth presenting them at least briefly. The CSDP constitutes an integral part of the EU's Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and it provides a framework within which Member States can shape Europe's strategic security and defence culture, jointly resolve conflicts and crises, protect the Union and its citizens and strengthen international peace and security. Due to the tense geopolitical situation, the CSDP has been one of the fastest growing policies of the last decade. Russia's aggression against Ukraine on 24 February 2022 and the threat of the outbreak of World War III revolutionised the geopolitical context in Europe and became an additional incentive to create the European Defence Union.

The origin of the Common Security and Defence Policy can be traced back to the Maastricht Treaty, which established the European Union. The Treaty defined the principles governing the relations between the European Union and the Member States, introducing the principle of respect for national identity and raising the principle of loyal cooperation to the EU level. Moreover, it set five basic goals for the EU to

¹⁵ *Orędzie o stanie Unii Europejskiej za 2022 rok, wygłoszone przez przewodniczącą Ursulę von der Leyen*, Strasburg, 14.09. 2022; R. Mützenich., *Die Welt im Umbruch. Der russische Krieg gegen die Ukraine ist eine globale Zäsur. Aber die Zeitenwende darf nicht nur militärische Fragen betreffen*, "Newsletter der IPG", ipg-journal.de, 24.02.2023.

achieve, which remain relevant up to now. They include confirming its identity in the international arena, in particular through the implementation of the common foreign and security policy that ultimately aims to determine a common defence policy¹⁶.

The European Union, established under the Maastricht Treaty, had a transparent structure composed of three 'parts' commonly known as pillars. The first pillar comprised the European Communities, the second one took care of common foreign and security policy, and the third one brought together cooperation in the field of justice and home affairs¹⁷. Mutual cooperation within Pillar II was aimed at strengthening security in the Community by systematic development of cooperation in this area between the Member States¹⁸.

Under the Maastricht Treaty, the Member States entrusted the European Union with competence the scope of which was extended under the subsequent revision treaties: the Treaty of Amsterdam (1999), the Treaty of Nice (2003), and the Treaty of Lisbon (2009), which entered into force on 1 December 2009¹⁹. The Treaty of Lisbon gave the European Union legal capacity and the capacity to perform legal acts in international relations. According to J. Węc, "The Lisbon Treaty, by introducing changes to the TEU and the TFEU, significantly expended the European Union's competence in the common foreign and security policy as well as the common security and defence policy. The liquidation of the pillar structure of the European Union is the most important change, which results, inter alia, in the fact that the area is included in the EU's external activities. This does not mean, however, that the common foreign and security policy is covered by a single Community regime. It rather still maintains its international specificity"²⁰.

The Treaty of Lisbon has played an important role in the development of the CSDP, the aims, tasks and functioning of which are laid down in Title V (General provisions on the Union's external action and specific provisions on the common

¹⁶ J.M. Fiszer, *Geneza traktatu z Maastricht...*, p. 17; J.J. Węc, *Spór o kształt ustrojowy Wspólnot Europejskich i Unii Europejskiej w latach 1950-2010*, Księgarnia Akademicka, Kraków 2012, pp. 209–212.

¹⁷ J. Maliszewska-Nienartowicz, *System instytucjonalny i prawny Unii Europejskiej*, TNOiK "Dom Organizatora", Toruń 2010, p. 31.

¹⁸ J. Starzyk-Sulejewska, *Francja i Niemcy wobec wspólnej polityki bezpieczeństwa i obrony Unii Europejskiej*, "Studia Politica Germanica" 2012, no. 1, pp. 197–229. Also see: S. Parzymies, *Polityka zagraniczna i bezpieczeństwa w ramach EWG*, "Sprawy Międzynarodowe" 1992, no. 1-2, pp. 51–57.

¹⁹ J.J. Węc, *Traktat lizboński. Polityczne aspekty reformy ustrojowej Unii Europejskiej w latach 2007-2009*, Księgarnia Akademicka, Kraków 2011; J.M. Fiszer (ed.), *Parlament Europejski po traktacie z Lizbony. Doświadczenia i nowe wyzwania*, Instytut Studiów Politycznych PAN, Warszawa 2011; J.M. Fiszer, *Modernizacja Unii Europejskiej w dobie kryzysu i kształtowania się nowego ład globalnego. Szanse i zagrożenia*, "Politeja" 2013, no. 26, pp. 149–168

²⁰ J.J. Węc, *Traktat lizboński...*, p. 247.

foreign and security policy), Chapter 2 (Specific provisions on the common foreign and security policy) and Section 2 (Provisions on the common security and defence policy). On the other hand, the role of the European Parliament in the CFDP and the CSDP is clearly determined in Title V, Chapter 2, Section 1 (Common provisions) and Article 36, and the principles of financing both policies are laid down in Article 41. In addition, the CSDP is described in detail in the amendments to the Treaty of Lisbon, mainly in Protocols: No. 1 (on the role of national parliaments in the European Union), No. 10 (on permanent structured cooperation established by Article 42 of the Treaty on European Union) and No. 11 (on Article 42 of the Treaty on European Union), as well as Declarations No. 13 and No. 14 (concerning the common foreign and security policy). What is important, as far as the decision-making process is concerned, the European Council and the Council of the European Union shall adopt decisions concerning the CSDP unanimously (Article 42 TEU). Some important exceptions include decisions concerning the European Defence Agency, which was established in 2004 (Article 45 TEU), and permanent structured cooperation (PESCO, Article 46 TEU), to which qualified majority voting shall be applied²¹.

It is also necessary to mention the important role of the European Parliament in the functioning of the EU's CSDP. It supports the EU integration and cooperation in the field of defence. The Treaty of Lisbon enables the Parliament to participate fully in the development of the CSDP, which makes it a partner who influences the EU's external relations and the solutions proposed to address challenges in the field of security²².

The EU's actions within the CSDP consists in the organisation of various civilian and military missions and operations, which aim to protect borders, resolve international crises and conflicts, and organise training for various services, as well as armed and police forces. NATO and the UN perform similar tasks. Since 2003 and the first interventions in the Western Balkans, the EU has launched and carried out 37 operations and missions on three continents. According to the data of February 2023, 21 missions and operations were carried out within the CSDP (12 civilian missions and 9 military operations, including two on the sea). Currently, the number of the EU military and civilian personnel abroad accounts for circa 4,000 people. The latest missions and operations have increased the military capabilities of the Nigerian Armed Forces to combat terrorist armed groups (EUMPM Niger), strengthened the ability of the Ukrainian Armed Forces to defend the integrity of the territory of Ukraine (EUMAM Ukraine) and contributed to increasing human security in areas affected by the conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan (EUM Armenia). *Nota*

²¹ J.J. Węc, *Traktat lizboński ...*, pp. 247–282. Patrz także, K. Miszczak, *Reforma wspólnej polityki zagranicznej i bezpieczeństwa*, [in:] J. Barcz (ed.), *Traktat z Lizbony. Główne reformy ustrojowe Unii Europejskiej*, Instytut Wydawniczy EuroPrawo, Warszawa 2008, pp. 236–253.

²² J. Jaskiernia, *Pozycja Parlamentu Europejskiego w systemie instytucjonalnym Unii Europejskiej po Traktacie z Lizbony*, [in:] J.M. Fiszer (ed.), *Parlament Europejski po traktacie z Lizbony ...*, pp. 153–178

bene, the decisions to deploy missions or operations are usually taken at the request of a partner country or based on the UN Security Council resolution²³.

The EU's cooperation with NATO, which constitutes the basis of Europe's security architecture, plays an important role in the process of strengthening Europe's security. The strategic partnership between the EU and NATO is based on a package of agreements, the so-called "Berlin Plus" agreement concluded on 16 December 2002. It includes, inter alia, the following parts: The NATO-EU security Agreement, Assured Access to NATO planning capabilities for EU-led Crisis Management Operations (CMO), or Availability of NATO assets and capabilities for EU-led CMO. The agreement was first applied in spring 2003 in Operation CONCORDIA in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, and next in the on-going EUFOR Operation Althea in Bosnia and Herzegovina. It is worth emphasising that the first joint declaration defining seven specific areas of enhanced cooperation between the EU and NATO was signed in Warsaw in July 2016. The EU has also concluded partnership agreements in the field of crisis management and security with the OSCE, the ASEAN and the African Union²⁴.

Due to the threat from imperial Russia, cooperation within the EU-NATO strategic partnership has been tightened. In 2021 the European Commission initiated and implemented, inter alia, the European Defence Fund, which co-financed numerous military projects worth over EUR 3 billion, and in 2023 an additional EUR 1.2 billion was allocated for projects in important areas of defence such as space situational awareness, countering hypersonic missiles, and designing and developing a prototype of a new class of military vessels – the European patrol corvette. In January 2023 a new Joint Declaration on EU-NATO cooperation was signed to cover further areas of cooperation such as emerging and disruptive technologies, climate and defence, as well as space. The EU and NATO also established a dedicated Task Force on the resilience of critical infrastructure in order to enhance common security. In June 2023, at the request of the European Commission, the European Parliament and the Council of the EU concluded an agreement on strengthening the European defence industry through common procurement. EUR 300 million was allocated for this purpose. It is intended to strengthen interoperability and cooperation between the EU Member States in the field of defence industry. Moreover, on 7 July 2023 the Act in Support of Ammunition Production (ASAP) was adopted to contribute to the increased production capacity of surface-to-surface ammunition, artillery ammunition and missiles, because it turned

²³ T. Kucera, *What European Army? Alliance, Security Community or Postnational Federation*, "International Politics" 2019, vol. 56, pp. 32–48; A. Dumala, *Unia Europejska*, [in:] M. Pietraś (ed.), *Międzynarodowe stosunki polityczne*, Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Marii Curie-Skłodowskiej, Lublin 2021, pp. 145–176.

²⁴ A. Dumala, *Unia Europejska ...*, p. 172; H. Ojanen, *The EU and Nato: Two Competing Models for a Common Defence Policy*, "Journal of Common Market Studies" 2006, vol. 44, no. 1, pp. 34–46.

out that many EU countries had been producing too small amounts of ammunition in recent years. EUR 500 million was allocated for this purpose²⁵.

The admission of Finland to NATO on 4 April 2023 was also important for the security of Europe, and Sweden will soon become a member of the Alliance. Thus, 22 out of the 27 EU Member States belong to NATO. In addition, on 1 July 2022 Denmark joined the EU's Common Security and Defence Policy, outside of which it had been for 30 years, and began to participate in the above-mentioned EU missions and operations. In May 2023 it became the 26th member of PESCO²⁶.

Summing up the above analysis, one can state that the Common Foreign and Security Policy, together with the Common Security and Defence Policy and the European Neighbourhood Policy, has been one of the most important spheres of the EU activities since its establishment in 1993, which significantly contributes not only to the strengthening of security in Europe, but also in other regions of the world. Regardless of the cooperation with NATO and other international organisations, the EU should continue to strive to create an autonomous system of security in Europe and strengthen its position in the international arena. It is important in the context of the upcoming presidential elections in the United States, which can be once again won by Donald Trump, a politician with extremely populist views and an isolationist attitude in foreign policy disregarding the European Union and NATO. This may weaken the EU's cooperation with NATO and the United States, which will have an impact on the CSDP and the level of Europe's security. Therefore, within the CSDP framework, the EU should strive to have military capabilities and provide itself with broadly understood 'hard security'.

2. REFORMS AND EVOLUTION OF THE EU'S COMMON SECURITY AND DEFENCE POLICY IN THE YEARS 2016-2023: FAILURES, SUCCESSES AND PROSPECTS

Starting from 2016, i.e. the moment the "EU Global Strategy" was announced, the CSDP has been successively reformed and is evolving towards an effective security system for the EU and its Member States, and de facto for Europe. The essence of the CSDP and its reforms is not replacing and undermining the competence of the Member States in this field. It does not consist in duplicating allies' tasks and activities within NATO, either. Moreover, the CSDP is not aimed at creating a European army. Its role and task are to verify defence capabilities, fill gaps in technology and

²⁵ *Orędzie Przewodniczącej Komisji Europejskiej Ursuli von der Leyen o stanie Unii Europejskiej 2023 rok*, Urząd Publikacji Unii Europejskiej, Luksemburg 2023.

²⁶ *Ibid.*

equipment, co-finance joint projects and, in the long term, harmonise standards of equipment for the EU Member States' armed forces. In addition, they include the creation of supranational agencies and bodies serving as a platform for communication in the field of security and defence policy of the European Union Member States²⁷.

The Treaty of Lisbon, which accelerated the evolution of the CSDP, did not change or improve the decision-making process in matters of foreign and security policy, which I believe is one of the reasons behind its weaknesses. The main role and management of the CSDP have been transferred to the European Council and the Council of the European Union, as well as various commissions and committees headed by the Political and Security Committee (PSC), which limit the role of national states in reforming the CSDP and its evolution and activities for Europe's security. As Michał Piechowicz writes: "(...) debates on the CSDP are closely related to the issue of structure and agency/decision-making. Scholars taking a traditional institutional approach perceive the CSDP institutions as forums for constraints on conducting domestic policies by the Member States, locking governments in potentially ineffective (in their opinions) processes. On the other hand, constructivists emphasise interconnectedness of the structure, which in the context of the CSDP evolution leads to new solutions in the management and decision-making sphere"²⁸.

The evolution of the CSDP and its practical effects are undoubtedly greatly influenced by the EU's cooperation with NATO, which was reflected in the subsequent summits of the Alliance in Wales, Warsaw and Brussels and the declarations adopted at their conclusion: the Warsaw Declaration on Transatlantic Security (2016), the Brussels Declaration on Transatlantic Security and Solidarity (2018) and the EU-NATO Joint Declaration on Cooperation (2018). The documents emphasise that the goal of the EU and NATO cooperation consists in interoperability, non-duplication of activities, sharing resources, strengthening communication not only at the strategic level, but also at the tactical and operational levels, creating common centres and developing cooperation between agencies and institutions²⁹.

The declarations were followed by a number of specific decisions that are important for the evolution of the CSDP and its activities for Europe's security. In December 2020, the Council reached a political agreement with the European Parliament on the regulation establishing the EDF in the perspective of the Multiannual Financial Framework 2021-2027. In order to ensure financial support for joint research and development projects and better military cooperation within the CSDP, the European

²⁷ M. Piechowicz, *Ewolucja Wspólnej Polityki Bezpieczeństwa i Obrony UE w kontekście teorii integracji oraz realizowanych działań*, "Przegląd Politologiczny" 2022, no. 28, pp. 37–51; J.J. Węc, *Perspektywy reformy Wspólnej Polityki Bezpieczeństwa i Obrony Unii Europejskiej do 2025 roku*, "Politeja" 2022, no. 3(78), pp. 211–239.

²⁸ M. Piechowicz, *Ewolucja Wspólnej Polityki Bezpieczeństwa i Obrony UE ...*, p. 41.

²⁹ Ibid, pp. 43–44

Defence Fund (EDF) and Permanent Structural Cooperation in the field of security and defence (PESCO) were created. Nearly EUR 8 billion has been allocated for EDF in the EU budget for 2021-2027, which is managed by the Directorate-General for Defence Industry and Space (DEFIS) established for this purpose. The decisions allow for taking actions “enhancing the availability, interoperability, flexibility and capability to deploy forces, in particular by determining common objectives for their engagement” and “supporting the Member States in allocating their budgets in the most efficient way without duplication of actions, and thus avoiding ineffective expenditures that could be prevented through closer cooperation”³⁰.

In spite of my earlier critical remarks, the CSDP has been evolving since 2016 and has already achieved some successes, both in organisational and functional terms. Besides the launch of PESCO and the signing of the agreement on the civilian dimension of the CSDP, it is necessary to mention the adoption of the off-budget European Peace Facility (EPF). On 30 June 2022, the European Commission announced the first call for tenders under the off-budget European Peace Facility. The European Union finances, inter alia, common costs of military missions and operations, as well as training and weapons purchases for the CSDP needs, which makes sharing the burden between Member States more solidary. Despite the harmonisation of defence processes within the CSDP, the governments of the Member States retain the ability to unilaterally choose the supplier of equipment and weapons. Hence, cooperation within the CSDP mechanisms in this specific aspect should be treated as the exception rather than the rule for now. In my opinion, the still existing difficulties with the proper and full use of the wide range of opportunities offered by the CSDP are related to the unprecedented nature of this policy and the difficult to predict direction and pace of the European integration, as well as the fate of the European Union, which still faces the dilemma of choosing between playing the role of a serious world leader and falling into marginalisation in the international arena, which will result in a bipolar world (the USA – the PRC). The Fathers of Europe, inter alia Robert Schuman, stated that the goal of the European integration was to prevent next wars and to begin gradual construction of a European federation. According to the neo-functional conception, further deepening of integration at the political level will make it possible to establish a unified federalist European state, and thus acquire the attributes of a full superpower according to not only neoliberals’, but also realists’ understanding. There are also individual researchers (e.g. Andrew Moravcsik), who already treat the EU as a superpower³¹.

³⁰ Ibid, pp. 45–46

³¹ J.M. Fiszer, *Unijne koncepcje reform Unii Europejskiej i jej stanowisko wobec dalszej integracji Europy*, [in:] K.A. Wojtaszczyk, T. Wallas, P. Stawarz (ed.), *Przyszłość Unii Europejskiej ...*, pp. 13–31; A. Moravcsik, *Europe: The quiet superpower*, “French Politics” 2009, Vol. 7, No.3/4, pp. 113–136.

Earlier, i.e. in June 2021, the European Union started working on the future of the European Security and Defence Policy, i.e. on the implementation of the idea submitted in 2020 by the German Presidency of the EU Council, which resulted in the development of the so-called “Strategic Compass for Security and Defence”. It was intended to strengthen the Member States’ involvement in the implementation of the CSDP, which in general had already been included in the “EU Global Strategy” of 2016. It is a political document that defines the Union’s security and defence strategy for the nearest 5-10 years. It provides guidelines for the EU on the achievement of strategic autonomy in four important areas: crisis management, resilience, capacity and partnership. It should eventually result in building a EU as an entity being able to ensure security of its members and peace in Europe. However, as a result of the Russian aggression against Ukraine in 2022, the document had to undergo major changes in order to take into account the destabilisation of the European security order and adapt the EU’s position, ambitions and tools in the field of defence to the new situation in Europe. Only on 24-25 March 2022, during the French presidency, did the European Council approve the final version of the “Strategic Compass”. This is only half the battle because the road to building the EU’s strategic autonomy is still very long. According to the assumptions of the CSDP reform announced in 2016, it is to be preceded by the creation of the European Union Rapid Reaction Force by the end of 2025. If this is achieved, it will certainly strengthen the position of the EU in the international arena and open the way to the establishment of the European Security and Defence Union, which will seriously strengthen the Euro-Atlantic security system³².

It is worth noting here that the strategic autonomy of the EU, which is envisaged in the “Strategic Compass”, should not constitute an oppositional/competitive system to NATO, as previously proposed by Germany and France, but a system strengthening Euro-Atlantic security so necessary in connection with the on-going war in Ukraine, which Russia cannot win because its imperial policy will continue to threaten Europe and the world.

CONCLUSIONS

The analysis of the available source materials confirms the theses and hypotheses formulated in the article and makes it possible to answer the research questions asked. The war with Ukraine unleashed by Putin, which has and will continue to have a significant impact on the reforms and evolution of the European Union’s CSDP could have

³² M. Sus, „Kompas Strategiczny na rzecz Bezpieczeństwa i Obrony” Unii Europejskiej w kontekście wojny w Ukrainie, [in:] J.M. Fiszler, T. Stępniewski (ed.), *Unia Europejska w turbulentnym świecie ...*, pp. 159–178; J.J. Węc, *Perspektywy reformy Wspólnej Polityki Bezpieczeństwa i Obrony Unii Europejskiej do 2025 roku*, “Politeja” 2022, no. 3(78), pp. 211–239.

been avoided if the West, and in particular the United States, Germany and France, had pursued not such a passive, even pro-Russian policy, but a decisive and coordinated policy of containment of Putin to prevent the implementation of his sick visions, which he had been preaching since he took over as president of the Russian Federation. Moreover, Ukraine should have been admitted to NATO a long time ago, which would have stopped Putin from aggression against this country. Unfortunately, in April 2008, during the NATO summit in Bucharest, Angela Merkel and President Nicolas Sarkozy did not support the United States' initiative regarding the participation of Ukraine and Georgia in the Membership Action Plan (MAP), which could have opened the way for these countries to join NATO and the EU, because they feared it would anger Russia. It was a mistake, which emboldened Putin and paved the way for the annexation of Crimea in 2014 and Russia's aggression against Ukraine on 24 February 2022³³.

If Russia wins the war, it will dictate peace conditions, and one of them will be the lack of consent for Ukraine's membership in the Euro-Atlantic system and for sure in NATO. Moreover, Russia's aggression against Ukraine has resulted in far-reaching changes in the balance of power in the international arena. It exposed the low effectiveness of the policy on security of Europe and the world adopted by many international organisations led by the European Union and NATO and showed it requires deep reforms, inter alia, the creation of an effective system of deterring potential aggressors, as well as an efficient decision-making process based on qualified majority voting and the limitation of the use of the right of veto. These organisations should also have the right to take preventive actions in order to preclude the outbreak of war between states in conflict³⁴.

Moreover, the institutional and decision-making issues in the context of the CSDP should be approached through the prisms of ensuring the participation of institutions representing supranational interests in this process and at the same time guaranteeing that the Membership States' governments have influence on it. It is necessary in order to fairly balance the interests of the Community with the, sometimes different, vital interests of individual Member States³⁵.

³³ A. Bielawska, *Niemiecka chadecja wobec konfliktu rosyjsko-ukraińskiego*, "Rocznik Integracji Europejskiej" 2015, no. 9; M. Kosman, *Konflikt rosyjsko-ukraiński z perspektywy niemieckiej (luty 2014 r. – luty 2015 r.)*, "Rocznik Bezpieczeństwa Międzynarodowego" 2015, vol. 9, no. 1; J. Kiwerska, *Kanclerz Merkel i relacje transatlantyckie*, "IZ Policy Papers" no. 39, Instytut Zachodni, Poznań 2022, pp. 20–23.

³⁴ J. Bielecki, *Weto coraz trudniejsze do obrony*, "Rzeczpospolita", 25.05.2023, p. A6; A. Słojewska, *Unijne weto wymaga reformy*, "Rzeczpospolita", 25.05.2023, p. A6.

³⁵ T. Kamiński, M. Gzik, *Trzydzieści lat niewygodnego partnerstwa – ewolucja stosunków UE-Chiny*, [in:] J.M. Fiszer, T. Stępniewski, *Unia Europejska w turbulentnym świecie ...*, p. 233; M. Piechowicz, *Ewolucja Wspólnej Polityki Bezpieczeństwa i Obrony UE ...*, pp. 37–38.

Due to the on-going decomposition of the security architecture in Europe and around the world, the EU is taking new initiatives to strengthen security of its members, but many of them are already belated. New investments and broader military cooperation are necessary, as well as maximising the effectiveness of expenditures on defence by all the EU countries in the years to come. It is a difficult and ambitious challenge, which must be supported by specific actions, programmes and funds.

In the last decade, the EU Member States have started implementing several programmes within the CSDP, which are supported by dedicated European funds. Solving dilemmas about such issues as maintaining the level of investment and quality in the sphere of security in the face of the reduced national budgets is their main goal. The EU's quick and decisive actions within the CSDP require that unanimity should be limited when decisions necessary for Europe's security are made, i.e. qualified majority voting should be used more widely and the use of the right of veto in the EU Council should be limited. The ability to take fast and decisive actions will be crucial for the EU's role as an important actor on the international scene, ready and able to defend the values and interests of its citizens in the increasingly uncertain global arena.

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THE EUROPEAN UNION'S COMMON SECURITY AND DEFENCE POLICY IN THE PERIOD 2016-2023: SUCCESSES AND FAILURES

Abstract

The aim of the article is to analyse the reforms of the European Union's Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP), with particular emphasis on the new EU external security strategy adopted in 2016 and its evolution, achievements and failures in the years 2016-2023. In addition, the article will present the European Union's stance on Russia's aggression against Ukraine on 24 February 2022 and its impact on the evolution and reforms of the CSDP, as well as the necessary changes in the EU's foreign policy and the European security strategy. The main thesis statement of the article is that the reforms of the European Union's CSDP have been defensive in nature so far and, due to the current international situation, it should be radically changed. Inter alia, the EU's *soft power* policy should be supplemented with *hard power* activities. The decision-making process in matters relating to the EU's foreign and security policy should also change; in particular, the use of the right of veto requires urgent reform. This will not be easy to achieve but it is necessary in order to let the European Union respond quickly and effectively to emerging threats to the security of its members and peace in Europe.

Keywords: European Union, reforms, CSDP, aims, tasks, successes, failures

WSPÓLNA POLITYKA BEZPIECZEŃSTWA I OBRONY UNII EUROPEJSKIEJ W LATACH 2016-2023: SUKCESY I PORAŻKI

Streszczenie

Celem artykułu jest analiza reform Wspólnej Polityki Bezpieczeństwa i Obrony (WPBiO) Unii Europejskiej, ze szczególnym uwzględnieniem nowej strategii bezpieczeństwa zewnętrznego UE przyjętej w 2016 roku oraz jej ewolucja, osiągnięcia i niepowodzenia w latach 2016-2023. Ponadto zostanie tutaj ukazane stanowisko Unii Europejskiej wobec agresji Rosji na Ukrainę 24 lutego 2022 roku i jej wpływ na ewolucję i reformy WPBiO oraz niezbędne zmiany w unijnej polityce zagranicznej i strategii na rzecz bezpieczeństwa Europy. Tezą główną jest tutaj konstatacja, że dotychczasowe reformy WBSiO Unii Europejskiej miały charakter defensywny i w związku z obecną sytuacją międzynarodową powinna ona ulec radykalnej zmianie. M. in unijna polityka *soft power* powinna zostać uzupełniona o działania typu *hard power*. Zmianie ulec powinien też proces podejmowania decyzji w sprawach dotyczących polityki zagranicznej i bezpieczeństwa UE, a zwłaszcza pilnej reformy wymaga stosowanie unijnego weta. Nie będzie to łatwe do zrealizowania, ale jest konieczne, aby Unia Europejska mogła szybko i skutecznie reagować na pojawiające się zagrożenia dla bezpieczeństwa jej członków i pokoju w Europie.

Słowa kluczowe: Unia Europejska, reformy, WPBiO, cele, zadania, sukcesy, porażki

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