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## WILL THE TRANSATLANTIC TRADE AND INVESTMENT PARTNERSHIP BE THE ENGINE OF FREE TRADE?\*

### 1. CRISIS OF MULTILATERALIZATION OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE

The Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) is of special interest to the public. The draft agreement, based on very ambitious premises and comprising a broad range of issues, in general aims to establish a free trade area for the European Union and the United States. Elimination of the majority of barriers to the markets of the two partners, mainly non-tariff in character, is to result in triggering demand-supply processes, which – thanks to multipliers – are to activate trade and increase their GDP.

The benefits for the parties to the TTIP do not necessarily have to result in similar positive effects in the economies of third-party countries. This is so because it will depend on the proportion between trade creation effects and trade diversion effects caused by positive change in the conditions of trade for the members of the free-trade area, on the one hand, and the worsening of these conditions for their partners from third-party countries, on the other hand. Examples of these spill-over effects can be easily found. They are connected with the establishment of the EU customs union, which is an important element of the common market on this territory. As a result, the increased dynamics of member states' trade was observed mainly in their internal exchange. Thus, if we take into account the fact that the implementation of the TTIP objectives will result in the creation of privileged trading conditions for the parties whose social and economic potential and share in international

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\* This article was published in Polish language under title *Transatlantyckie Partnerstwo w Dziedzinie Handlu i Inwestycji – dźwignią wolnego handlu?*, „Myśl Ekonomiczna i Polityczna”, No. 1(44)2014, p. 17–44.

trade have a tremendous impact on economic conditions for all the other participants of the world economy and, as a result, the course of global economic processes, a question is raised: what will be the consequences of the discussed bilateral agreement for the idea of trade liberalisation on a global scale<sup>1</sup>.

The question is especially important from the perspective of the actions of the WTO, which – having received the legacy of the GATT – made a successive multilateral ambitious attempt, the Doha Development Round, to make world trade free of the existing barriers. However, there have been no signs of getting closer to reaching the objectives since they were set over a decade ago. The proliferation of various types of Free Trade Agreements (FTAs)<sup>2</sup> is, inter alia, a factor that hampers progress in the field. According to *The Economist*, there were 104 of them in the period 1958–2001, and the number has increased to 154<sup>3</sup> at present. On the other hand, *Financial Times* estimates there were 70 at the beginning of the period 1990–2010 and as many as 300 at the end of it. Quoting the outcomes of research into the phenomenon, it states that ca. half of the export from 30 biggest global exporters is subject to preferential conditions<sup>4</sup>. In the report developed for the European Council in February 2013, the European Commission – pointing out the difficulties that the multilateralization of liberalisation actions faces – emphasises that before 2006 only below one-fourth of the EU trade with third countries took place within FTAs and at present that accounts for 50%. Moreover, if negotiations with Japan and the USA are concluded, FTAs will account for two-thirds of the EU external trade<sup>5</sup>. This is why there is an opinion that the growth of the phenomenon on a global scale results in the phenomenon of world trade fragmentation.

However, nobody agrees with the thesis that there is only an antinomy between the growing number of free trade agreements and multilateralism. Just the opposite, many opinion-forming circles promote a view that FTAs and multilateral liberalisation actions are complementary elements. R. Azevedo, who was appointed Director-General of the WTO to succeed P. Lamy in Sep-

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<sup>1</sup> Almost 50% of goods of the global world production are produced in the EU and the US and their share in world trade accounts for 30%, [in:] *After long buildup, US-EU free trade talks finally begin*, Reuters of 08.06.2013.

<sup>2</sup> They are sometimes also called *Regional Trade Agreements – RTAs* – see: *The gated globe*, “The Economist”, 12.10.2013.

<sup>3</sup> *Ibidem*.

<sup>4</sup> M. Wolf, *Globalisation in a time of transition*, “Financial Times”, 17.07.2013.

<sup>5</sup> *Trade: a key source of growth and jobs for the EU*, Commission contribution to the European Council of 7–8 February 2013.

tember 2013, does not see any threats to multilateral negotiations conducted by the WTO from free trade agreements. According to the protagonists of this point of view, the general rationale behind FTAs development is a political will to extend the area of trade liberalisation, which encourages others to participate in such actions. This way new rules of trade become universal in character. It constitutes progress on the way to make the idea of lifting barriers, which in general matches the WTO philosophy, especially in the circumstances of a deep long-lasting deadlock in the Doha Round<sup>6</sup>.

It is not easy to refute the arguments of those who believe that FTAs are an alternative to multilateralism in the area of international trade liberalisation. According to this thesis, the discussed institutional agreements introduce an element of bilateralism, reserving the rights to the benefits only for the parties to liberalisation actions. As a result, they stop being interested in multilateral liberalisation. At the same time, the existence of FTAs institutionalises *de iure* discrimination against third countries (preferences within free trade areas or customs unions are exceptions to MFN status), which questions the benefits of the WTO membership based, inter alia, on the common use of the above-mentioned clause<sup>7</sup>.

The free trade agreement between the EU and South Korea, called a new generation FTA, is a practical example of the marginalisation of the WTO's role and importance. It introduces institutional solutions and mechanisms that are parallel to those existing within the above-mentioned international organisation. It concerns, for example, the bilateral mechanism of dispute resolution, by the way, based on the WTO model. It creates a sophisticated institutional structure in the form of sector and thematic working groups and committees, which aim to implement the agreement provisions in a harmonised way and are to prevent potential protectionist threats. Trade relations based on such an agreement provide the parties with benefits in the form of efficient, free from troublesome procedures, co-operation, especially in the field of dispute resolution. Moreover, they take place in discrete conditions that are often of key importance from the point of view of the parties' political image. Unlike in the case of the WTO procedures, a dispute may remain unpublicised and thus, it is easier to resolve it amicably.

The Comprehensive Economic Trade Agreement – CETA – a free trade agreement between the EU and Canada, which is being finalised, also confirms that a new value is developed. According to *The Economist*, due to its

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<sup>6</sup> Compare *WTO chief demands Bali settlement*, “Financial Times”, 10.09.2013.

<sup>7</sup> *The gated globe*, *op. cit.*

broad and far from the traditional patterns thematic scope, it is a prototype of the negotiated Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership between the EU and the USA<sup>8</sup>. Apart from traditional liberalisation actions with regard to customs or agricultural product quotas, CETA introduces measures in the field of investment and services facilitation. This is to result in the creation of new opportunities for the two partners across the Atlantic, e.g. freed from barriers access to lucrative procurement market (estimated to be worth \$2.6 trillion in the EU)<sup>9</sup>. As a result of CETA provisions, the process of company acquisitions in the two areas will be easier. There are to be special clauses aimed to equalise the conditions for doing business with regard to intellectual property and reciprocal recognition of professional diplomas, e.g. architects' and engineers' ones. The fact that services generate most of the GDP of the parties to the agreement (estimated to account for ca. 70%) raises hopes for fast development of trade in services and profits from them.

Thus, since the EU and the USA cover international trade with a dense network of free trade agreements, which offer new standards for the exchange, it is obvious that they obtain a global dimension<sup>10</sup>. Thus, FTAs become alternative to the WTO because they create a new value in international trade. On the other hand, third countries are obviously not beneficiaries of that alternative. G. Hufbauer of Washington based Peterson Institute of International Economics expressed that distinctly with regard to emerging markets: '... if they do not want to play for the WTO [allusion to their stand in the Doha Round – J. W.], we have our own alternatives'<sup>11</sup>. In other words, those who are absent (as parties to new FTAs) are not right. 'Big' players in global trade develop a new order there following the principle *divide et impera*.

This new order being developed now is based on the modified axiom: instead of tracking antinomy between protectionism and free trade, it is more adequate to weigh up free trade versus fair trade. In other words, various forms of international trade regulation are admissible, however, on condition that their creators have the biggest bargaining power. Although the statement is not revealing, its content acquires a new form. The long-lasting deadlock in the Doha Round reflects a deep division within the global economy with

<sup>8</sup> *Canada doesn't get any sexier than this (A trade pact with Europe points the way to a global market in services)*, "The Economist", 26.10.2013.

<sup>9</sup> *Ibidem*.

<sup>10</sup> As an example, it is worth mentioning the Trans-Pacific Partnership, which is being negotiated by the USA and is to be entered by Australia, Brunei, Canada, Chile, Japan, Malaysia, Mexico, New Zealand, Peru, Singapore and Vietnam.

<sup>11</sup> *The gated globe, op. cit.*

respect to the level of economic development as well as its consequences: prosperity and the way of securing interests. Thus, on the one hand, there are those who have comparative advantage in the most technically and technologically advanced fields and as post-industrial economies create most of their GDP in services and, on the other hand, those who are still too weak to take on contemporary challenges. The two big companies, Apple and Samsung, which are interested in the deepest possible penetration of international markets, struggle with one another in the area of intellectual property protection.

This leads to a conclusion that the WTO with 159 members now and very differentiated level of economic development is not able to effectively meet the challenges of the contemporary global trade. Thus, the marginalisation of the WTO's role on multilateral scale causes, on the one hand, that the most developed countries adopt the most sectional solutions eliminating various types of barriers to their markets and, on the other hand, that less developed countries look for the protection of their interests and use a new generation of protectionist measures. The research into the latter phenomenon, conducted within the Global Trade Alert by the London-based Centre for Economic Policy Research, shows that since 2009 a relatively small number of countries, namely Argentina, Brazil, India, Indonesia, Russia, South Africa and Turkey, which have a 13% share in the import of the G-20 countries, have been responsible for 60% of the protectionist measures introduced. They were estimated at 400 but their number is constantly growing<sup>12</sup>.

Classified as those that are known in literature as the 'beggar-thy-neighbour' policy measures, they have a feature, however, that differentiates them from the traditional ones. Although they are internal in character, because they are elements of economic policy of a given country, they do not differ from protectionist measures formerly used at the borders because they introduce discriminatory treatment of external suppliers. Regarding the wide range of new generation measures of own interests protection (this type of protectionism definition is getting more and more popular because is more adequate than the traditional one, which emphasised import-related measures), it is worth drawing attention to the steps taken by Argentina, Brazil, China and India. They aim to increase the share of the so-called local factor in the production process. In Argentina, it concerns a very broad range of branches and industries: mining, automobile industry, footwear production, agriculture, machine industry, construction materials, pharmaceutical and chemical sectors, and textile industry. This type of government policy also

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<sup>12</sup> *Ibidem.*

covers services and banking, insurance and media. In Brazil, local producers can benefit from tax exemptions on condition that they invest in research and development, and ensure broad co-operation within the Brazilian economy (compare the so-called programme of automobile industry support – INOVAR-AUTO). In China, there are regulations that provide access to government procurement only for innovative products of domestic origin. The Chinese also use a cheap and effective method of acquiring scientific and technical thought from abroad. Imposing an obligation on foreign investors to set up joint ventures, they obtain advanced technologies and then, with the use of cheap credit policy, develop their own production and become independent of their former partners. Treating local producers in a preferential way, India locks foreign investors' access to retail business, legal services, accounting, insurance and banking<sup>13</sup>.

Protection of local producers operating in the so-called sensitive branches in the above-mentioned countries is to ensure necessary conditions for development. Inter alia, a broad scope of financial support measures is to serve this aim. Government interventionism in this area (also called state capitalism), implemented via cheap credits, is nothing else but a hidden form of subsidising export, which is formally banned by the WTO and OECD. This not only regards Russia, Brazil, India or China, which are outside OECD, but also member states of that organisation. Over recent years, the American ExIm bank has granted \$120 billion worth of loans meeting the OECD requirements and almost the same amount (\$110 billion) failing to meet the OECD regime. In the latter case, it is much more than the banks of the above-mentioned BRIC countries did in the same period (\$70 billion)<sup>14</sup>. This shows the ambivalence of the criticism of these countries accused of using measures that are not in compliance with the WTO and OECD regimes. It is worth mentioning that not so long ago the governments of the US and France applied public aid measures to subsidise their domestic car manufacturers. Inter alia, Asian competitors whose very good technical offer was a relatively cheap one endangered their existence and the companies were saved under the banner of the so-called economic patriotism<sup>15</sup>. The 'Buy

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<sup>13</sup> A broad presentation of these protectionist practices of the above-mentioned states is found in the *Report from the Commission to the European Council – Trade and Investment Barriers Report 2013*, COM(2013) 103 final, 28.02.2013.

<sup>14</sup> *The gated globe*, *op. cit.*

<sup>15</sup> More on the issue can be found in: J. Wiczorek, *Protekcjonizm pozataryfowy – nowa odsłona [Non-tariff protectionism – new scene]*, „Myśl Ekonomiczna i Polityczna”, no. 1(40)2013, Uczelnia Łazarskiego.

American' slogan is also some kind of American economic policy canon and is used in marketing.

This ambiguous attitude to what is 'allowed' and what is 'banned' presented by the major 'players' in world trade is clearly shown in the case of economic policy in the field of the development of renewable energy production, especially in the context of solar energy. Subsidies play an extraordinarily important role at every stage of this branch – from the stage of producing photovoltaic cells to the distribution of energy. By the way, not long ago, the European producers of solar panels protested against the 'flood' of cheap Chinese panels on the European market. Because of that, the European Commission threatened the Chinese producers with the anti-dumping duty as high as 47.6%. When the Chinese threatened to use retaliation measures towards German car producers, the dispute ended with the introduction of a minimum import price for Chinese panels.

The already mentioned examples of BRIC states' actions that are not connected with the WTO regimes show that they are not only aware of low effectiveness of actions protecting their interests in the WTO, but first of all of their growing bargaining power. The thesis can be evidently verified in practice and Russia is the best example as it is the country that does not take into account the rules of the organisation (see e.g. the barriers to its market for agricultural products from the EU, including Poland or blocking import from Ukraine). Time will tell whether this is a temporary problem or a proof of a steady policy. What seems to confirm that the latter option does not lack sense are its efforts to strengthen the construction of the customs union being built together with Kazakhstan and Belarus, and attempts to convince Ukraine to join<sup>16</sup>. Thus, multilateralism of international trade rules suffers damage, and the shape of the new order in this field is also in the hands of the newcomers to the WTO.

Big multinational companies are the main protagonists of the development of FTAs. Continually looking for possibilities of cutting production costs by gaining benefits from optimal production scale, they are by nature interested in expanding their business activities. For example, car manufacturers strive for the unification of the components of their final products and they move production to places where costs per unit are the lowest. The reason for wanting to eliminate or minimise barriers to access to the place of operation becomes obvious then. This is also the context of the reason why Mexico

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<sup>16</sup> Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Armenia are next to join the union. By the way, one of the conditions for joining is bordering with at least one of the member states.

was included in the North American free trade area – NAFTA, although its economic development is lower than that of other economic partners in the region: the USA and Canada. Thus, the rationale behind FTAs is not only a similar level of economic development, but also a feasible circumstance of fast convergence of economic interests. That is why FTAs can include countries at a different level of development that are like-minded in the field of regional liberalisation. The bigger the level of penetration of their economy by the main FTA protagonists' companies, the bigger this 'inclination'. Thus, economic authorities of such countries must decide whether to agree on some concessions even in a situation when they lack adequate maturity to face external competition or to stay outside the area of liberalised trade and, as a result, face the negative consequences of marginalisation. The key arguments for regional liberalisation are benefits from intra-industry trade, which – thanks to multipliers – start cumulative processes of growth of the whole economy. This is why the argument of the growth of GDP resulting from FTAs development is emphasised. However, there is another issue connected with what benefits are derived from them for particular parties to FTAs.

In places where there is a strong conflict in the fight for markets, big corporations do not hesitate to use all possible measures in order to achieve their objectives. As the range of available instruments has been limited as a result of liberalisation actions within the WTO, they find new ones that are beyond the regimes of the organisation. Battles for patent rights fought by American Apple and South Korean Samsung in order to have sole rights to sell their products on their main markets are, as mentioned before, a perfect example of new trends in the policy of protection of economic interests of key participants of the contemporary international labour distribution. J. Schott of the already mentioned Peterson Institute of International Economics did not express his opinion accidentally that it will be better to resolve the dispute between the American manufacturer of aircraft, Boeing, and its European rival, Airbus, with regard to subsidies (both companies benefit from this kind of support for their production and sales, which is banned under the WTO rules) 'out of court'<sup>17</sup>. This means not following the principles of that organisation.

Regional agreements on free trade provide an opportunity to eliminate or substantially limit competition from third countries. Depriving them of the privileges that are the rights of the parties to these agreements automatically

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<sup>17</sup> *After long buildup...*, *op. cit.*

places these countries in a worse situation. Both the USA and the EU have reasons to be afraid of competition from the emerging markets, especially China. The establishment of TTIP may make these countries adopt the rules that will be developed within free trade agreements. These are rules that do not necessarily have to match their interests.

## 2. TTIP ORIGIN

So far, the trade exchange between the USA and the EU has not been conducted on preferential terms and has been based on the MFN status. Since the early 90s, however, there have been some agreements aimed to facilitate mutual economic co-operation. For example, in November 1990 the EU and the USA adopted the Transatlantic Declaration, based on which they undertook to consult each other on important matters of common interest on summit meetings. In February 1994, they developed the Early Warning System to identify problems in trade relations and react adequately to threats occurring in the area. The next programme defining the US-EU co-operation framework (December 1995) was the New Transatlantic Agenda together with the Joint Action Plan. The Transatlantic Economic Partnership of May 1998 and Positive Economic Agenda of May 2002 were to a great extent devoted to liberalisation of technical barriers in bilateral trade.

In 1995, L. Brittan, the EU Commissioner for Trade, formulated a proposal of liberalisation of the US-EU bilateral trade relations that would be based on a free trade agreement<sup>18</sup>. The establishment of the Transatlantic Economic Council – TEC in 2007, which was an important step in the implementation of that idea, aimed at developing broad economic co-operation framework. Three advisory groups were established within TEC in order to determine the direction of its operation: the Transatlantic Legislators' Dialogue for regulatory matters, the Transatlantic Consumer Dialogue for consumer related matters, and the Transatlantic Business Dialogue for business matters. Their work resulted in many agreements promoting co-operation in both trade and investment. Although they did not satisfy the aspirations of those whose desire was to give this co-operation a new, more activating character, the concluded agreements were a specific training field where the interests of both sides were confronted and possible compromises were

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<sup>18</sup> *Ibidem*.

looked for. This experience undoubtedly can play an important role in the TTIP negotiations<sup>19</sup>.

The next step on the way to build the TTIP foundations was the establishment of the High Level Working Group (HLWG) on Jobs and Growth at the EU-US summit meeting in November 2011. It was designed to

‘... identify policies and measures to increase EU-US trade and investment to support mutually beneficial job creation, economic growth, and international competitiveness’<sup>20</sup>.

In the Final Report of February 2013, the Group stated that it had analysed a series of options aimed at eliminating and reducing both tariff and non-tariff barriers, and developing adequate regulatory solutions in the field of trade, services and investment. Summing up, it drew a conclusion that the assigned objective can be obtained only in the form of a comprehensive agreement addressing a wide range of bilateral trade and investment issues, including regulatory ones, and contributing to the development of global trade exchange rules. It is worth mentioning the last part of that conclusion here, because it illustrates the EU-US ambition to develop such rules that can be compared with the principles of the WTO, in both complementary and competitive aspects.

When in February 2013 the US President B. Obama in the State of the Union address and the President of the European Commission M. Barroso announced that the parties would enter into negotiations, there was a wave of opinions and comments. Among them, the stand of the European Parliament is one that deserves special attention. In its resolution developed in April 2013 (put to the vote in May), the European Parliament points out there is a need to look for new solutions that can contribute to substantial economic benefits for both parties. The Parliament reminds the European Commission about the duty to inform it about the outcomes of all the negotiation stages immediately and that the final decision on the adoption of the developed agreement must be approved of by the European Parliament and the Council.

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<sup>19</sup> For example, in the agreement on investment: *US-EU Shared Principles for International Investments*, the parties reaffirmed commitment to the development of non-discriminatory investment policies, transparency in the development of laws in the area and fair and transparent dispute settlement; more on that agreement can be found in: *TTIP: szanse i wyzwania dla biznesu [TTIP: opportunities and challenges for business]*, a report by the American Chamber of Commerce in Poland, September 2013, pp. 12–13.

<sup>20</sup> *Final Report, High Level Working Group on Jobs and Growth*, 11.02.2013, p. 1.

It is a measure ensuring the supervision of the project by institutions representing the society and the EU member states.

The information about the EU and the US will to start talks to negotiate the TTIP resulted in enthusiastic comments made by big business and intensified lobbying for the agreement across the Atlantic. The stand of the business had a substantial influence on the two parties' bargaining power. In the United States, the institutions whose activeness is worth emphasizing are first of all the American Chamber of Commerce and international corporations representing e.g. automobile sector, IT industry and pharmaceutical industry. It is also worth mentioning that there was increased lobbying for the liberalisation of the EU regulations on GMO on the part of companies representing fodder and seed production sectors (e.g. Cargill and Monsanto).

The pressure exerted by the representatives of the US Congress on the US Trade Representative R. Kirk to make the American party strive to eliminate or limit the EU barriers, especially those designed to protect agriculture and food market, is worth discussing as a separate issue. According to a consumer organisation called Food and Water Watch, American economic diplomacy is heavily involved in safeguarding its country's big corporations' interests and it will surely do this during the TTIP negotiations in particular.

Support for the idea of limiting barriers within the agricultural-food sector was also expressed by the European lobbying organisations such as Food and Drink Europe, which is composed of, inter alia, such companies as Unilever, Kraft, Nestle and COPA-CEGECA organisation representing large farms. Taking into account that biotech industry across the Atlantic offers the TTIP negotiators 'support and assistance', the latter will have a hard nut to crack, especially when confronted with the stand of non-business groups and organisations<sup>21</sup>.

In the opinion of the Centre for Research on Globalisation (CRG), TTIP seems to be a "corporations' agreement" that may constitute "serious hazard for ordinary people, because it will weaken employment and social law, and lower environmental and consumer protection standards". The proof of that, according to the CRG, is the argument that international corporations and industry organisations provided 60% content input to the negotiating mandate for the TTIP<sup>22</sup>. Regardless of the credibility of this thesis, we cannot be indifferent to the stand of the European film and music industry circles on the above-mentioned agreement. It is a proof that their fears are in some sense an incarnation of the Europeans' fears of being flooded with American

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<sup>21</sup> See: *corporateeurope.org* of 26.08.2013.

<sup>22</sup> Compare: *geopolityka.org* of 28.06.2013.

civilizational standards with regard to audio-visual sector products. Under the informal leadership of France, 14 states of the EU sent a letter to the European Commission, in which they call for excluding film industry from TTIP. 170 people of the film industry, including A. Wajda, J. Skolimowski and A. Holland, signed a similar letter to the Prime Minister of the Republic of Poland D. Tusk. Following the leakage of information that the US intelligence agencies had tapped the European politicians and citizens, Germany demanded to introduce a special clause preventing such activities to the negotiations. However, according to experts, the request was made after the EU negotiating mandate had been adopted so there is little chance of that issue being taken into account<sup>23</sup>.

In such atmosphere and conditions, in March 2013 the European Commission presented the member states with key issues of the negotiating mandate, which was adopted in April 2013. In the same month the Congress gave American Administration consent for starting the TTIP negotiations. President B. Obama, President of the European Commission M. Barroso, President of the European Council H. Van Rompuy and Prime Minister of the UK D. Cameron announced that in their joint statement in June 2013 during the G8 Summit in Lough Erne in Northern Ireland. It is the parties' intention to go through a fast negotiation process, possibly in a year's time. However, due to the complexity of the negotiated issues, that short period seems to be too optimistic. Election to the European Parliament and the change of the European Commission in 2014 may be a factor hampering the negotiations, but it can also speed them up. Other, unpredictable circumstances may take place, too. The second round of negotiations (the first one was in July 2013) was postponed from October to November because of the deadlock in the US Congress in connection with the enactment of legislation appropriating funds for the next fiscal year. As a result, the US government entered a complete shutdown.

The TTIP negotiators were: on the American side – D. Mullaney of the Office of the US Trade Representative and I.G. Barcero of the Directorate-General for Trade of the European Commission. A wish to obtain understanding and support of the so-called social partners is an important element of the negotiations. After the first round the negotiators met 150 representatives of academic circles, trade unions, private sector industry and trade associations, consumer organisations and NGOs in order to present negotiation issues and answer their questions. This is to be a routine procedure in the pending negotiations.

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<sup>23</sup> *German spy backlash threatens EU-US Pact*, "Financial Times", 04.11.2013.

### 3. SIGNIFICANCE OF THE TTIP FOR THE EU AND THE US, AND THIRD COUNTRIES

The parties to TTIP are the key partners in their international trade exchange. For example, the EU is the second biggest US market for trading in products and the first one regarding export of services. The EU is the biggest foreign investor in the US. The conclusion of the TTIP agreement will result in the establishment of the world's biggest free trade area (see Table 1 below).

**Table 1**

**Economic exchange between the EU and the US in 2011 (billion USD)**

	<b>Export</b>	<b>Import</b>	<b>Total</b>
<b>European Union</b>			
Goods	2,170.0	2,396.5	4,566.6
US share	17.0	10.9	
Share in global trade in goods (%)	15.1	16.4	
Services	829.6	662.8	1,492.4
Share in global trade in services (%)	25.7	21.6	
<b>United States</b>			
Goods	1,480.4	2,265.9	3,746.3
EU share	18.2	16.6	
Share in global trade in goods (%)	8.1	12.3	
Services	588.6	394.8	983.5
Share in global trade in services (%)	13,8	9,8	
<b>Total</b>			
Goods	3,650.5	4,662.4	8,312.9
Services	1,418.2	1,057.6	2,475.8
Share in global trade in goods (%)	23.2	28.7	
Share in global trade in services (%)	39.4	31.4	

Source: *TTIP: szanse i wyzwania dla biznesu, op. cit.*, p. 15.

The data on the EU and the US bilateral trade in products and services as well as this trade share in global exchange confirm the thesis that the TTIP will have a substantial impact on the future conditions for global economic relations. Both within its framework and the EU-US bilateral trade,

inter-corporation exchange plays an extremely important role and there are obvious signs that it will intensify. These are big international corporations of the two parties that are major investors on their territories and they play a similar role on a global scale (see Table 2). Thus, their enthusiastic attitude towards TTIP should not be a surprise.

Table 2

## Foreign direct investment (FDI) of the EU and the US in 2011 (billion USD)

	EU	USA	Total
Internal investment	8,195.9	3,509.44	11,705.2
EU share (%)		61.6	
US share (%)	35.3		
Global FDI share (%)	39.3	16.8	56.1
External investment	9,245.5	4,500.0	13,745.4
EU share (%)		50.4	
US share (%)	28.5		
Global FDI share	43.1	21.0	64.1

Source: *TTIP: szanse i wyzwania dla biznesu, op. cit.*, p. 15.

The general objective of TTIP is liberalisation of the economic exchange between the EU and the US. It is to result from the reduction and elimination of both tariff and especially non-tariff barriers that limit economic exchange, and adequate changes in norms and standards in the protection of intellectual property, health, security and the environment. This is to result in higher effectiveness of economic exchange, the improvement of the conditions and climate for investment, and an increase in the competitiveness of companies involved in bilateral trade, especially small and medium-size enterprises. The increased dynamics of economic exchange will result in the increase in employment and GDP<sup>24</sup>.

<sup>24</sup> The Polish-American Chamber of Commerce in Poland developed very interesting review of of benefits from TTIP for the parties' companies, economies and consumers. The first group of benefits include: (1) substantial lowering of transaction prices in trade; (2) essential lowering of the cost of entering the EU and the US markets; (3) better conditions for production co-operation; (4) lower costs of access to half-finished products and raw materials; (5) higher predictability of the investment surrounding and lower investment risks. The second group includes such benefits as: (1) increase in trade (in goods and services) exchange; (2) increase in investment

The fact that an institution with the status guaranteeing the formulation of independent conclusions, the London based Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR), was commissioned to do research into the above-mentioned issues was a step that performed a scientific-cognitive function as well as informative-propaganda one. The expert opinion that was developed this way could serve that purpose more effectively, on the one hand, providing the TTIP supporters with strong arguments and, on the other hand, overcoming potential resistance and distrust of those who treated the discussed undertaking with fear<sup>25</sup>. According to the authors of the above-mentioned research institution's report, the development of the EU-US free trade area may result in global benefits for the EU at €119 billion annually (0.5% of GDP) and €95 billion for the US (0.4% of GDP) in the same period. In the context of an average EU household, additional yearly income was estimated at €545 and in case of an American family at €665. Although the report does not provide a clear picture regarding changes in employment, it is estimated that the increase in pay in the two economies will be at 0.5%<sup>26</sup>.

Since the average level of MFN tariffs *ad valorem* is in general low both in the EU and the US (in 2011: 5.3% and 3.5% respectively), the biggest effects of the liberalisation process are to result from the limitation of non-tariff barriers (ca. 80% of all benefits)<sup>27</sup>. Consequently, this is to trigger export growth, especially in the industry sectors, e.g. transport facilities (by 6%), chemicals (by 9%), metal products (by 12%), and especially motor vehicles (by 41%)<sup>28</sup>.

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flows; (3) possible decrease in prices of products and services that, as a result, stimulates growth in consumption; (4) increase in employment, GDP, household incomes etc. – see: *TTIP: szanse i wyzwania dla biznesu, op. cit.*, p. 10.

<sup>25</sup> *Reducing Transatlantic Barriers to Trade and Investment, An Economic Assessment*, Final Project Report, Prepared under implementing Framework, Contract TRADE 10/A2/A16, Joseph Francois (project leader), Centre for Economic Policy Research, London March 2013.

<sup>26</sup> According to the above-mentioned report, since 2017, ca. 7 employees per 1,000 will change their workplace as a result of TTIP; the European Commission estimates that every additional 1 billion euros in commerce increases employment by 15,000 work places. See: *Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership, The Economic Analysis Explained*, European Commission, September 2013, p. 8.

<sup>27</sup> *Najczęstsze pytania na temat transatlantyckiego partnerstwa w dziedzinie handlu i inwestycji [Questions and Answers about Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership]*, European Commission, 15.07.2013.

<sup>28</sup> *Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership. The Economic Analysis Explained, op. cit.*, p. 7.

The TTIP negotiators will have a very difficult task to do in connection with agriculture-food products. It is not only the issue of higher level of average tariffs on these products than on industrial ones in both areas (by the way, also higher in the EU than in the US), but also very difficult regulations that evoke strong emotions among consumers and can be classified as non-tariff ones. In order to eliminate European consumers' fears (e.g. in case of American food they concern the presence of GMO in agricultural plant production or growth hormones in animal husbandry), the European Commission promises that the regulations aimed at the protection of human life and health, animal life and welfare, and the natural environment will not be subject to negotiations. The negotiation process will undoubtedly verify this principled stand, but even today it can be said that it will be necessary to reach a compromise solution.

As a result of triggering the processes of demand growth in the TTIP free trade area, third countries are expected to benefit from the agreement in the form of their GDP growth, estimated at €99 billion. As far as this is concerned, the CEPR's assessment of positive effects of TTIP differs from the outcomes presented in the report of a German research institute IFO, which also undertook the task of assessing the above-mentioned agreement<sup>29</sup>. According to the second report, although there might be bigger benefits from the agreement than the first report suggests (GDP growth per capita in the EU and the US might reach 5% and 13.4% respectively), this would happen mainly at the expense of third countries. For example, it would be expressed in the GDP per capita decrease in Japan by 6%, in Australia by 7.4% and in Canada by as much as 9.5%. German trade with the BRICS countries would decrease by 10% and the fall of the US trade with these countries would be even bigger and reach 30%. The IFO report assesses that in practice all third countries would lose after the development of the transatlantic free trade area, however, to a different extent<sup>30</sup>.

Not surprisingly, the estimates presented in the second report caused a wave of emotions and criticism. For example, in Norway, where the result of TTIP was supposed to be a decline in GDP per capita by 3.9% and an increase in unemployment accounting for 12,000 people, they started considering (see the opinions expressed e.g. by U. Sverdrup, Director of the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs, T. Giske, Minister of Industry

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<sup>29</sup> *Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP). Who benefits from a free trade deal?*, Global Economic Dynamics, Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2013.

<sup>30</sup> *Ibidem*, pp. 30 and 42–43.

and Trade, or the Confederation of Norwegian Enterprise) such a solution that would extend the TTIP preferences over the country and even the whole EFTA<sup>31</sup>. The issue of TTIP also raised anxiety in Switzerland. Due to the fact that the USA constitutes the second market (after Germany) for Swiss products and American export tariffs (e.g. on watches or chemicals) are high, in the opinion of the Swiss government and entrepreneurs' organisations, the *Economiesuisse* effects of TTIP may be very disadvantageous for the Swiss. The possible loss of the major part of the Swiss export price competitiveness on the EU and US markets makes the political and economic establishment in this country consider the necessity of a resumption of bilateral talks with the USA on free trade agreement (stopped in 2006 because Switzerland was not ready to make agricultural concessions)<sup>32</sup>.

In general, the conclusions of the IFO report with regard to all the negative aspects of TTIP have been strongly criticised. First of all, because of the research methodology adopted. The authors were accused of paying too much attention to the negative consequences of the effect of the trade shift for third countries and insufficient consideration of positive consequences of the creation effect for them<sup>33</sup>. What the final balance of these effects for third countries is going to be will depend, as practice shows, on many factors that in their complexity could not have been taken into account in the IFO theoretical research. One thing seems to be certain: TTIP will privilege big companies of the two parties to the agreement and they will be, in general, the beneficiaries of the free trade area.

#### 4. TTIP AND POLAND

The IFO report specifies Poland's benefits (GDP per capita growth by 3.7%) as relatively lower than those of e.g. Germany (by 4.7%), Sweden (by 7.3%) of the UK (by 9.7%). Although Poland is for the US the most important trade partner and beneficiary of American direct investment of all the countries of the region, the level of bilateral trade as well as FDI does not match the potential possibilities of the two parties. Thus, this means

<sup>31</sup> nPortal Press/ POLMEDIA, 2013.

<sup>32</sup> Information provided by the Department of Promotion of Trade and Investment of the Embassy of the Republic of Poland in Bern based on *Neue Zürcher Zeitung i Berner Zeitung*, 2013.

<sup>33</sup> *Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership. The Economic Analysis Explained*, *op. cit.*, p. 11.

that expected benefits from TTIP will be lower than those of the European countries whose economic relations with the US are more developed.

Table 3

## Trade turnover between Poland and the US in the period 2008–2011 (billion USD)

	2008	2009	2010	2011
Turnover	7,066.8	5,923.6	7,353.6	8,484.2
Export	2,470.5	2,482.4	2,873.3	3,693.1
Import	4,596.3	3,441.2	4,480.3	4,791.1
Balance	-2,125.8	-958.8	-1,607.0	-1,098.0

Source: Ministry of Economy data.

Although the trade turnover between Poland and the US show a growing trend, their balance for Poland is in deficit. In 2011, the US was the 15<sup>th</sup> export partner and the 9<sup>th</sup> import partner of Poland. With regard to the product range, industrial goods dominated both export and import, but most of them were medium- than highly technically and technologically developed<sup>34</sup>. This inter-industry character of exchange mainly has direct link with inter-corporation trade. This is so because well-known American corporations, as e.g. General Motors, operate in the economy of Poland. Although, according to the central bank of Poland – NBP, the US is the 6<sup>th</sup> in the field of FDI (at the end of 2010: \$12.4 billion, i.e. 6.2% share in the total FDI in Poland), taking into account the fact that American firms invest in Poland through third countries (e.g. Holland, Germany or Luxemburg) the value of American involvement in the whole investment is estimated at \$20-30 billion and employment level at ca. 180,000. It is worth mentioning here that Polish direct investment in the USA is much poorer and accounted for \$1.1 billion at the end of 2010<sup>35</sup>.

Due to the product range exported to the US, most of our goods are subject to low tariffs (ca. 4% *ad valorem*). The so-called tariff chimneys occur

<sup>34</sup> The main groups of products in Poland's export to the US are: electric and mechanical devices (\$1.1 billion, 31% share), vehicles, aircraft, vessels and their elements (\$0.5 billion, 13.2%), various products including mainly furniture (\$0.4 billion, 10.0%) and mineral products (\$0.3 billion, 8.6%). With respect to import, the products are as follows: electric and mechanical devices (\$1.5 billion, 32% share), chemicals (\$0.8 billion, 16%), optical instruments (\$0.5 billion, 11%) and mineral products (\$0.4 billion, 8.2%). – Ministry of Economy data.

<sup>35</sup> Ministry of Economy data, Portal Promocji Eksportu, 2013.

in case of agricultural-food products (e.g. tobacco and industrial substitutes for tobacco – 204.2%)<sup>36</sup>. As far as non-tariff barriers are concerned, it is worth pointing out the denied issuance of work visas and work permits for Polish employees seconded to the US by their companies in order to provide services within concluded contracts. Among technical barriers (TBTs) that make access for Polish to the US market difficult, the following factors are the most important: standardisation, certification, accreditation, technical norms and compliance testing procedures, product labelling, product safety, environmental protection, and consumer protection. In case of Polish agricultural products of animal and plant origin, the sanitary and phyto-sanitary (SPS) regulations are very restrictive barriers<sup>37</sup>. For example, obligatory tests conducted by American laboratories to eliminate risk of agrophag presence in the imported agricultural products may take 2–3 years<sup>38</sup>. In the area of public procurement, there are many formal-legal procedures that are real obstacles for those who are bidding for a contract in the US (American Recovery and Reinvestment Act together with the Buy American provisions). They favour domestic suppliers and impose obligatory American content in a foreign offer.

In the light of the above, easier access to the US market as a result of the TTIP agreement may undoubtedly have a positive impact on the Polish economy. It is rightly emphasised in the report of the Polish-American Chamber of Commerce that this influence would translate, on the one hand, directly into the turnover between Poland and the US and, on the other hand, indirectly – through the trade creation effects connected with the increase in the American economy import demand for products of other (not Polish) companies (e.g. German ones) that co-operate with ours. The Chamber estimates that in this area the TTIP rules might result in medium- and long-term increase in Polish-American trade by at least 20–30%<sup>39</sup>. This might provide a successive strong impulse for FDI to flow to Poland from the US and other countries interested in the promising prospects for the growth of our export.

New opportunities would unquestionably appear for Polish small and medium-size enterprises, which play a very important role in our economy. For example, TBT/SPS harmonisation means eliminating cost generating and time consuming activities, i.e. obstacles to free trade in goods and ser-

<sup>36</sup> *TTIP; Szanse i wyzwania dla biznesu, op. cit.*, pp. 20–21.

<sup>37</sup> More about the restrictive TBT/SPS role in international trade in: J. Wiczorek, *Protekcjonizm pozataryfowy...*, *op. cit.*, pp. 52–58.

<sup>38</sup> *TTIP: Szanse i wyzwania dla biznesu, op. cit.*, p. 24.

<sup>39</sup> *Ibidem*, p. 29.

vices. In a situation in which the lack of sufficient capital for operations on foreign markets is an obstacle, it gives a chance to compete with the 'great'. Altogether, the advantageous impact on the position of these companies will depend on lowering transactional costs and benefits from the scale of production and export resulting from the easier access to the US market. Lowering the costs of supply import from the US may subsequently lower the costs of production and increase price competitiveness of export to the US.

It is also worth looking at the benefits from TTIP from a different perspective. Wider opening of the US agricultural market, which has been strictly protected so far, might open new prospects for Polish producers and exporters of agricultural food products. The cost of imported energy might be lowered in Polish economy thanks to cheap shale gas, LNG, imported from the US, however, in the light of current US regulations it is not possible<sup>40</sup>. Polish consumers would also be able to buy cheaper American consumption goods.

The final balance of effect of TTIP will undoubtedly depend on the costs of its implementation. What must be taken into consideration is the input connected with the adjustment activities on the part of the European and American business entities, both at the formal-legal plane and the practical one – in production and export. Liberalisation of access to the EU and the US markets will also cause the increase in competitiveness and elimination of those who – deprived of the hitherto available 'protectionist umbrella' – will not be able to face the new challenges. Even today, some representatives of Polish agribusiness emphasise threats resulting from the opening of the Polish agricultural market for a very competitive agricultural export from the US<sup>41</sup>. One more issue cannot be overlooked here: the opinions formulated in Poland and in other EU countries about the possible negative repercussions of the adoption of American standards of the protection of consumers, animals and the environment, which are deemed to be less rigorous than the European ones.

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<sup>40</sup> *Transatlantyczne Partnerstwo na rzecz Handlu i Inwestycji oraz jego znaczenie dla eksportu gazu LNG z USA do Europy [Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership and its significance for export of LNG from the USA to Europe]*, [in:] *System euroatlantycki w wielobiegunowym łańdźu międzynarodowym [Euro-Atlantic system in the multipolar international order]*, (ed.) J.M. Fiszer and P. Olszewski, Institute of Political Studies of the Polish Academy of Sciences, Department of European Studies, Warszawa 2013.

<sup>41</sup> See: speech at the conference on TTIP organised by the Representation of the European Commission in Poland, Warszawa 21.10.2013.

## 5. MULTILATERALISM VERSUS REGIONALISM IN THE LIGHT OF THE BALI PACKAGE AND WHAT NEXT?

It was emphasised earlier that the regional free trade agreements that are being negotiated now – TPP and TTIP – leave main emerging economies – Brazil, India, Indonesia, Nigeria, Russia, South Africa and first of all China and developing countries – beyond their reach. Apart from the strictly content-related issues, mainly connected with possible worsening conditions of access to the parties' markets and resulting negative consequences for their economic development, psychological issues are of great importance. Because a real danger of marginalisation of their role appears here, both in the international labour distribution and within the organisation, which – although cannot provide a guarantee that their rights in international trade will be observed – creates opportunities for claiming them. Of course, this refers to the WTO, which has not been able to be proud of any successes so far and the Doha Round seemed to confirm the thesis on its evident fall.

That is why the agreement reached during the 9<sup>th</sup> ministerial WTO conference on Bali at the beginning of December 2013 on the so-called Bali Package really caused enthusiasm among the participants as well as the media<sup>42</sup>. First of all, the psychological-symbolic dimension of the agreement is emphasised. It is the first agreement of this type since the beginning of WTO and the inauguration of the Doha Round. Although it was based on the principle of the lowest common denominator and covers only 10% of the Doha Round agenda, it raises the morale of those who, because of various reasons, found themselves behind the mainstream of regional trade liberalisation and gives hope that the policy of small steps has a better chance of success than the former WTO 'all or nothing' principle. It is emphasised that the Bali Package is of universal significance for both 'big players' and those less important. This is so because, generally speaking, it deals with the limitation of administrative procedures in connection with customs clearance and ensures better trading conditions for the least developed countries repealing the provisions on subsidies with regard to various food aid programmes for the poorest. It is aimed to result in a substantial increase in international trade turnover, employment and GDP globally<sup>43</sup>; and besides, these positive

<sup>42</sup> E.g. *Bali breathes life into global trade*, "Financial Times", 09.12.2013; *Pakiet z Bali ma uwolnić handel z okowów biurokracji [Bali Package is to free trade from bureaucracy]*, "Dziennik Gazeta Prawna", 10.12.2013.

<sup>43</sup> It is estimated that international trade will increase by \$2 billion (by 11%), GDP by \$960 million annually (by 1%) and creation of new work places by 21 million, includ-

effects would be experienced by less developed countries. It is worth pointing out here that such distribution of benefits from the Bali Package is to create an impression that mainly the interests of emerging markets and developing countries are taken into account and, at the same time, it exposes the achievements of R. Azevedo, who managed to breathe new life into the Doha Round negotiations, which were in a complete deadlock, in a relatively short time after he had been appointed Director- General of the WTO. It is worth mentioning that the new Director-General comes from Brazil and it is of some symbolic importance, especially for less developed countries, because as a representative of the country that was in opposition to the EU and the US stand in the Doha Round, he managed to achieve some progress in the area.

Taking into account potential benefits from the Bali Package (by the way, it must be ratified by all the WTO member states to enter into force), it would be naive to suppose that a major breakthrough was made in the approach to the implementation of the Doha Round. Since TTP and TTIP cover 70% of the world trade exchange, the issues of trade liberalisation on both regional and global scale are decided at the negotiation tables of the two agreements<sup>44</sup>.

However, it is already obvious that it will be a very difficult task. The pressure of the US Congress in connection with agricultural issues within the TTIP negotiations has been already mentioned. At present, American congressmen also demand that TTIP contains a currency manipulation clause, which is to eliminate the possibility that US partners, use monetary dumping in order to increase price competitiveness of their export. Having in mind the experience of the government shutdown period, President B. Obama will certainly try to bypass standard legislative procedures in case of international agreements with the use of a waiver called Trade Promotion Authority and this way deprive Congress of the possibility of blocking TTIP.

Various problems concerning TTIP may also appear in the EU. The IFO report pointed out that particular member states were to have quite different benefits from the agreement being negotiated with the US. Countries that have more developed relations with the US (e.g. the UK and Ireland) will benefit more and countries with relatively weaker links (e.g. France) will benefit less. Therefore, the French establishment has reservations about TTIP, fuelled by traditional mercantilism, the contemporary feature of which

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ing 18 million in developing countries, *Pakiet z Bali...*, *op. cit.* By the way, one cannot resist an impression that the above figures seem to be too optimistic.

<sup>44</sup> *Time to cheer up, Special Report: America's foreign Policy*, "The Economist", 23–29.11.2013.

is the already mentioned economic patriotism and a decisive will to protect the interests of the domestic agricultural lobby. The case of Great Britain is not less nuanced than that of France. Demonstrating Eurosceptic attitude, D. Cameron's government craves for all the benefits from the mechanisms of the common EU market. It also wants to extend them by developing EU free trade relations with third countries. This is why, apart from the support to TTIP, the British capital wants to establish this kind of co-operation plane with China. D. Cameron's and a numerous British entrepreneurs' visit in this country at the beginning of December 2013 was surely intended to serve this purpose. By the way, the European Commission did not express enthusiasm for that initiative. This is not an obstacle for many member states to strive for Chinese capital to be invested on their territory and attempt to increase their export of capital, goods and services to China. Prospects for the development of the Chinese economy, which will be more and more driven by domestic consumption, confronted to crisis phenomena that are still occurring in many EU member states, will surely be factors strongly influencing the European citizens' way of thinking. Seeking realistic possibilities of extending markets for European goods, the EU resumed talks with Mercosur (a bloc of Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, Uruguay and Venezuela) on FTA (suspended in 2000). The economic conditions in both unions make the EU have fewer fears about the inflow of South American agricultural food and the countries of that region, especially Brazil, are stronger and can face the competitiveness of industrial products from the EU<sup>45</sup>. This means that both the EU and the US, not waiting for the results of the TTIP negotiations, actively try to find possibilities of extending the liberalised access area for their export.

Will the specific 'Balkanization' of global trade caused by the growing number of regional free trade agreements, even taking into account the case of the Bali Package, petrify atomisation of that exchange? Not necessarily, because FTAs may be easily incorporated in the global trade system. There is a solution, referred to as plurilateral agreements, which make it possible for countries to join FTAs when they want and in such a framework that will be available for them. Of course under the condition that an FTA is open to third countries and it is necessary to implement the agreed liberalisation code. It is pointed out that the exchange of computer services and technologies, and goods connected with the protection of the environment are especially useful

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<sup>45</sup> Compare: *Strategic patience runs out*, "The Economist", 14.12.2013.

areas where these types of agreements are possible. The rules of investment also seem to be right to be subject to the above-mentioned solutions<sup>46</sup>.

Time will tell to what extent this will influence the TTIP negotiations. They are not taking place in a vacuum and the influence of internal as well as external factors for the parties is unquestionable. One thing seems to be absolutely certain today: we witness deep changes with regard to the rules of global economic exchange, the role and importance of which – by the way, so far – reflect the interests of the most influential parties to these relations. It is not possible, however, to predict whether the above-discussed issues will disintegrate more or integrate the model worked out laboriously after World War II within GATT/WTO.

## SUMMARY

Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership is an initiative that can substantially change the architecture of the contemporary world economic exchange. Due to the role and importance of the parties to the future agreement on the free trade area in that exchange – the European Union and the United States – the rules of liberalisation negotiated by them can substantially change the former, universal order in the field existing within the WTO. Taking into account the growing number of agreements on free trade areas, the thesis of the growing, as a result, fragmentation of the global trade exchange seems to be confirmed in practice. At the same time, the liberalised economic exchange areas that come into existence provide profits not only for their participants. The balance of the effects of the diversion and the creation of trade will, *inter alia*, decide on the size of the benefits. At the same time, the level of national economies' ability to adequately face the challenges will decide what the costs will be for the particular entities of world trade. Based on experience, it is known that developed countries and their multinational corporations manage in such situations best. Thus, new rules of global economic exchange are developed in this circle and positive effects of these changes are concentrated there. Although there are attempts to make developing countries beneficiaries of world trade liberalisation, e.g. in the form of the Bali Package within the WTO, the positive effect of these steps is more hypothetical than realistic for them. Although Poland, as the

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<sup>46</sup> Compare: *Life after Doha*, "The Economist", 14.12.2013.

EU member, has real chances to benefit from TTIP, it will be determined by the will to introduce adequate reforms in management and structural changes in the national economy aimed to increase product competitiveness in the field of innovation. The need to develop a stable framework of efficient co-operation between the government and business, and – in general – improvement of social communication is one of the conditions of success in this undertaking.

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## WILL THE TRANSATLANTIC TRADE AND INVESTMENT PARTNERSHIP BE THE ENGINE OF FREE TRADE?

### Summary

The Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership is an undertaking that can completely change the contemporary structure of global trade relations. Due to the role and importance of the economic exchange between the parties to the future free trade agreement: the European Union and the United States, the rules of liberalisation negotiated by them can change the present, universal order within the WTO system. Having taken into consideration the increasing number of agreements that create new free trade areas, one can say that the thesis that, as a result of that phenomenon, there is an increasing fragmentation of global trade seems to be confirmed in practice. What the benefits are going to be will depend on the balance of trade changes and development. At the same time, what the costs are going to be for particular parties to the global economic exchange will mainly depend on their national economies’ ability to meet challenges adequately. It is well known that developed countries and their multinational companies cope with such conditions best. New rules of global economic exchange are created

and the positive effects of these changes in that exchange concentrate in this area. Although there are attempts to make developing countries beneficiaries of the world trade liberalisation, e.g. the Bali Package within the WTO, the positive effect of these initiatives is more hypothetical than real for them.

## TRANSATLANTYCKIE PARTNERSTWO W DZIEDZINIE HANDLU I INWESTYCJI – DŹWIGNIĄ WOLNEGO HANDLU?

### Streszczenie

Transatlantyckie Partnerstwo w Dziedzinie Handlu i Inwestycji jest przedsięwzięciem, które może istotnie zmienić architekturę współczesnej światowej wymiany gospodarczej. Z uwagi na rolę i znaczenie w tej wymianie stron przyszłego porozumienia w sprawie strefy wolnego handlu: Unii Europejskiej i Stanów Zjednoczonych wynegocjowane przez nie reguły liberalizacji mogą w zasadniczy sposób zmieniać dotychczasowy, uniwersalny porządek w tym obszarze, funkcjonujący w ramach WTO. Uwzględniając fakt rosnącej liczby porozumień, powołujących do życia odrębne strefy wolnego handlu, teza o rosnącej – w konsekwencji tego zjawiska – fragmentaryzacji globalnej wymiany handlowej zdaje się mieć praktyczne potwierdzenie. Jednocześnie powstające strefy zliberalizowanej wymiany gospodarczej przynoszą korzyści nie tylko ich bezpośrednim uczestnikom. O tym, jakie będą rozmiary tych korzyści, będzie m.in. decydował bilans efektów przesunięcia i kreacji handlu. Jednocześnie o tym, jakie będą też koszty poszczególnych podmiotów światowej wymiany gospodarczej, zadecyduje w zasadniczym stopniu zdolność ich gospodarek narodowych do adekwatnego sprostania powstającym wyzwaniom. Z praktyki wiadomo, że w tej mierze najlepiej sobie radzą kraje rozwinięte i ich koncerny o globalnym zasięgu działań. W tym kręgu powstają nowe reguły globalnej wymiany gospodarczej i w nim koncentrują się pozytywne efekty zachodzących w tej wymianie zmian. Wprawdzie podejmowane są próby uczynienia z krajów rozwijających się beneficjentów działań liberalizujących handel światowy, w postaci chociażby „pakietu z Bali” w ramach WTO, jednakże pozytywny efekt tych działań jest dla nich w większym stopniu hipotetyczny niż realny.

## ТРАНСАТЛАНТИЧЕСКОЕ ПАРТНЁРСТВО В ОБЛАСТИ ТОРГОВЛИ И ИНВЕСТИЦИИ – ДВИГАТЕЛЬ СВОБОДНОЙ ТОРГОВЛИ?

### Резюме

Трансатлантическое партнёрство в области торговли и инвестиций является проектом, который может существенно изменить структуру современного международного экономического обмена. С точки зрения роли и значения в этом обмене сторон будущего соглашения относительно зоны свободной торговли – Европейского Союза и Соединённых Штатов – принятые ими правила либерализации могут принципиальным образом изменить прежний универсальный порядок в этой области, который функционирует в рамках ВТО. Учитывая факт растущего количества соглашений, ведущих к образованию отдельных зон свободной торговли, тезис о растущей – как следствие этого явления – фрагментации глобального торгового обмена, имеет все основания для подтверждения на практике. Одновременно появляющиеся зоны либерализованного экономического обмена приносят выгоду не только их непосредственным участникам. О том, каковым окажется объём этой выгоды, будет, в частности, решать баланс результатов смещений и создания торговли. Одновременно о том, каковы будут также издержки отдельных субъектов мирового экономического обмена, в значительной степени решит способность их национальных экономик адекватно воспринимать новые вызовы. Известно из практики, что в этом отношении лучше всего справляются развитые страны и их концерны с глобальным охватом деятельности. В этой сфере создаются новые принципы глобального экономического обмена, и именно в ней концентрируются положительные результаты происходящих с этим обменом изменений. Правду говоря, принимаются попытки сделать из развивающихся стран бенефициаров действий по либерализации мировой торговли, хотя бы в виде „пакета из Бали» в рамках ВТО, однако положительный результат этих действий для них является в большей степени предположительным, чем имеющим место в действительности.