Integration through Control: the Model of Power Hijacking as an Alternative View on European Union Integration

Abstract

The following paper presents a possible new explanation for the
European Union’s turbulent integration. By combining elements of game
theory, neo-functionalist theory and its neo-realist account as well as devoting
special attention to liberal intergovernmentalism it presents a method of
thinking about the way in which European states function and calculate their
behaviours in relation to integration efforts. Through that it attempts to build
an initial framework for an alternative way of thinking about integration
and disintegration of the European Union. Countries attempt to control
one another through products of a centralised political process, imposing
limitations on freedom of action of others: the more control, the less freedom
of action and the more integration as a result. The same mechanism can
be both responsible for tendencies of integration as well as disintegration,
since countries that fail to increase their ability to control others see that as
an asymmetrical gain for others, and tend to opt out from integration, or to
disassociate themselves from the project altogether.