On Three Criteria for the Assessment of the European Central Bank Legitimization in the Period of Crisis

Abstract

The European Central Bank (ECB) is perhaps the only technocratic institution
of the European Union, which gathers substantial authority during the
crisis. It is also perceived as an institution, which successfully stabilizes the
crisis in the euro area. The article is aimed at explaining the phenomenon
of that bank during the crisis. First of all, the question whether the ECB
activities are appropriately legitimized is answered. Does the crisis-based
situation authorize the Bank to go beyond the treaty mandate? Is the ECB
really efficient and does it improve its ‘utilitarian legitimization’? Does it
remain a reliable institution, i.e. independent of the biggest states’ political
influence? In addition, the author presents the Bank’s activities political
repercussions for the formulation of the ‘technocratic quasi-federation’ that
was under the strong informal influence of the biggest member states.